This equivocation arises, I suspect, because critique has been informed by transcultural psychiatry, a field which saw a treaty, as it were, between psychiatry and anthropology to share 'epistemic authority' -'the legitimate power to define, describe, and explain bounded domains of reality'[13] -over a particular domain of mutual interest. This epistemological
showing that around 80% of people with serious mental, neurological, and substance abuse disorders in so-called 'less-developed countries' had received no treatment in the previous 12 months, set against a proportion of '35-50%' for the same group in 'developed countries' (p. 7 in World Health Organization [1] ). Summerfield stringently criticises this kind of manifesto, arguing that such 'psychiatric universalism risks being imperialistic' [2] . Scaling up psychiatric services to close the presumed gap in mental health provision extinguishes local 'in globalising Western mental health, we are globalising a contemporary Western way of being a person' (p. 5 in Summerfield [2] ).
In a similar vein, Ethan Watters objects to the spread of Western psychiatric models:
Americans have been industriously exporting their ideas about mental illness. … they've failed to foresee the full impact of these efforts. It turns out that how a people in a culture think about mental illnesses -how they categorize and prioritize the symptoms, attempt to heal them, and set expectations for their course and outcome -influences the diseases themselves. In teaching the rest of the world to think, they have been, for better and worse, homogenizing the way the world goes mad. [3] Watters argues that Western psychiatry is a culturally dependent therapeutics fitted to culturally dependent Western psychopathologies such as (he believes) depression and anorexia. He therefore declares that, because of the globalization of US psychiatry, 'Modes of healing and culturally specific beliefs about how to achieve mental health can be lost to humanity with the grim finality of an animal or plant lapsing into extinction' (p. 8 in Watters [3] ).
Although this article addresses a particular conceptual problem in contemporary critique of the global mental health agenda, there are potentially empirical challenges to Watters's thesis and its various analogues. Like Watters, Suman Fernando laments 'the imposition of bio-medical psychiatry across the world and opening of markets for Big Pharma that would follow' [4] . This remark betrays a rather homogeneous vision of Western psychiatry. The biomedical model of psychiatry may indeed be dominant in the West, but it is certainly not universally accepted: from anti-psychiatry to recent calls for a move beyond the aims, after all, is 'to creatively and usefully challenge the relative cultural isolation of western models of psychiatry' [6] .
Thorough empirical investigation of the global mental health agenda and its consequences, extending to cultural impact, systemic outcomes, and patient outcomes, is surely essential. However, to the extent that cultures of mental illness and therapeutics are indeed globally converging on a Western and predominantly biomedical model, I shall argue that this should not be viewed as loss or extinction of non-Western ethnopsychiatries. (I use the term 'extinction', of course, without implying any broader analogy with biological evolution.) Concepts such as 'cultural extinction' (and even 'culture' itself) are, I believe, highly problematic, and should be removed from the terms of the debate. This would allow a more coherent critique to emerge in which the focus is not upon preserving diversity, but upon promoting the best forms of dialogue and interchange.
It is helpful to distinguish allies to the cultural extinction argument. A distinct, but aligned, argument highlights the wisdom of non-Western traditions. Alongside his concern at the opening of new markets for Big Pharma, Fernando calls for cultures handle human problems. [4] There are at least two thoughts here. One is that we should protect cultural difference in itself -the request to be 'respectful of cultural diversity'. The other is that by so doing we preserve a reservoir of indigenous knowledge which one day might inform our own expertise. The demand to liberalise the global marketplace in psychiatric ideas (and practices), and to have genuinely reciprocal dialogue between forms of expertise, is particularly imperative given additional concerns about the risks of Western intervention. Watters, for instance, gives a social constructionist analysis of the way in which post-disaster counselling in LMICs may inadvertently make things worse by promoting psychological vulnerability (p. 131 in Watters [3] ).
Opposition to Big Pharma, reciprocal recognition of non-Western expertise, and commendable clinical caution, are, however, quite distinct from the thesis that cultural diversity in mental illness and therapeutics is, in itself, desirable. Such a position is part of wider concern about so-called cultural imperialism. John Tomlinson notes that while 'cultures have always influenced one another and that this influence has often enriched the interacting communities', contemporary 'cultural synchronisation' is an 'unprecedented feature of global modernity' [7] . Cees Hamelink refers accordingly to an ongoing process of 'cultural synchronization' in which 'decisions regarding the cultural development in a given country are made in accordance with the interests and needs of a powerful central nation' [8] .
Debates about cultural synchronization commonly centre on language, religion, art forms, and so forth. Hamelink complains, for instance, that 'the incredibly rich local musical tradition of many Third World countries is rapidly disappearing under the onslaught of dawn- [8] ). Such debates transpose to cultural difference in psychopathology and therapeutics. The most obvious relevant phenomena are culturally bound syndromes, where cultural difference itself is the fundamental pathogenic factor. These need little or no introduction: culturally specific conditions such as koro (penisretraction/shrinking) are recognised by official nosology. There are also more subtle cultural differences, such as variation in 'idioms of distress' -'socially and culturally resonant means of experiencing and expressing distress in local worlds' [9] . Idioms may range from various psychological and somatic complaints, to seeking out healthcare and diagnosis, or even to just smoking more (pp. 405-6 in Nichter [9] ). (There are also broadly similar concepts such as variation in the 'symptom pool', those 'templates, or different ways of presenting illness' held in a 'culture's collective memory of how to behave when ill' [10] ). So it may be argued that the global mental health agenda promotes a psychiatrically-led homogenization in culturally dependent psychopathology, ranging from gross features such as culturally bound syndromes, to the particularities of idioms of distress.
But a fundamental question remains: why is such cultural convergence in itself a loss or destruction, analogous (following Watters), to 'an animal or plant lapsing into extinction'? This is a problem faced generally by what Anthony Appiah calls the 'preservationist ethic' [11] , by which 'assimilation is figured as annihilation' (p. 130 in Appiah [11] ).
However, to defend the view of cultural synchronisation as extinction is harder than it might at first appear. 'for me', even -we suppose -right down to ways of being ill that are good 'for me'. The problem facing this account, however, is that 'one's culture could only be whatever it was that one actually practiced, and couldn't be lost or retrieved or preserved or betrayed' (p. 137 that something belongs to our culture cannot count as a motive for our doing it since, if it does belong to our culture, we already do it and if we don't do it (if we've stopped or haven't yet started doing it), it doesn't belong to our culture. … It is only if we think that our culture is not whatever beliefs and practices we actually happen to have but is instead the beliefs and practices that should properly go with the sort of people we happen to be that the fact of something belonging to our culture can count as a reason for doing it. [12] Michaels and Appiah tend to exemplify with cultural features such as teaching Shakespeare in school. But their argument can be illustrated with ethnopsychiatric materials. If Consuelo from South America reads English-language pop psychology, and stops having ataques de nervios and starts having depression, then her depression is as much her idiom of distress as nervios used to be. If this change is to count as a loss of Consuelo's culture, then we need some sense of what Consuelo's idioms of distress should be -her 'real' or 'authentic' culture, as opposed to the one she actually has. As both Michaels and Appiah remark, this used to be done by categorizing people through explicitly racial or ethnic concepts (one might in Consuelo's case have invoked some kind of racial psychology). But now such categorization seems to be done merely by implicitly racial or ethnic thinking -there needs to be some conception of Consuelo's proper group (and its typical culture), for her changed idiom to count as loss rather than change. But what this might be is unclear. For commentators who view homogenization of culturally dependent psychopathology as extinction, the onus is on them to find an answer that avoids cultural essentialism -that does not posit a racial, ethnic, or national 'essence' lurking within Consuelo's soul, and which must find proper expression 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Consuelo's changed idiom not as a loss 'for her' (or 'for them'), but rather as a loss to global cultural diversity -to the 'external diversity' apparent when the world is viewed as 'a grid of communities hewing each to its own customs and creed' (p. 149 in Appiah [11] )? Such preservationism is not motivated by a sense of cultural propriety, but by the desire to protect a mosaic of differences, including even the difference between distress as ataque de nervios and distress as depression. This model, which resonates with ideas of biodiversity, is, however, vulnerable to the charge of ethnocentrism, and may be viewed as an extension of Western global dominance. The Western expert speaks on behalf of the putatively threatened 'other', demanding 'preservation' much as the earlier imperialists demanded 'education' and 'enlightenment'. As Tomlinson remarks, 'the problem of homogenisation is likely to present itself to the Western intellectual who has a sense of the diversity and "richness" of global culture as a particular threat'; but 'we cannot, without irony, argue that the Western intellectual's (informed?) concern is more valid' (p. 109 in Tomlinson [7] ). Why should we discourage Consuelo from being depressed, as opposed to having an ataque de nervios?
Appiah allows that there may be an aesthetic (or even curiosity) value to the Western spectator in preserving external diversity, but 'it would be a moral error to take measures … to discourage members of these picturesque communities from leaving and joining ours' (p. A further problem should be noted. While idioms of distress will presumably always be needed, things are different with culturally bound syndromes, where culture itself is the fundamental cause (analogous to a biological pathogen). If koro dies out, then this cultural extinction, as with the extinction of the smallpox virus, simply means one less ill (or illness) in the world. We can speculate about the consequences of such an extinction, and whether they might be better or worse (perhaps koro prevents something even worse from happening).
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